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Doctor Keynes:  Economic Theory in a Diagnostic Science 
 
I. Theory and Practice 
For the greater part of his professional life John Maynard Keynes was known as a 
practical man:  the author of topical tracts on current economic questions, an advisor to, 
and an emissary from, the British Treasury, a successful player of financial markets for 
himself and King’s College, a member of corporate boards, a portfolio manager for two 
insurance companies.  He was, in this sense, a part-time academic.  And, although he had 
long been known to be a first-rate economist, it was only after the publication of the 
General Theory of Employment Interest and Money in 1936 that he was able to secure his 
reputation as a first-rate economic theorist.  Yet, of the ten volumes of books published in 
his lifetime, three (the General Theory, and the two volumes of the Treatise on Money, 
volume 1 subtitled The Pure Theory of Money and volume 2, The Applied Theory of 
Money) feature “theory” in their title.  And if we note that three of the remaining volumes 
are clearly non-economic and two are as much political as economic, the proportion of 
his economic books self-consciously styled as theoretical rises to three-fifths.  Even one 
of the remaining volumes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, contains a clearly theoretical 
core.  If Keynes was indeed a theorist, what kind of a theorist was he? 
  In modern economics, theory has come to denote the particular field of economics 
that deals with formal representations of abstract economies divorced from particular 
applications – a synonym for mathematical economics.  Theory may inform particular 
applications through models that particularize or instantiate theories under special 
assumptions.  Accepting such a view, DeVroey (2004) argues that “reasoning in prose is 
not a model strictu sensu, the arising of macroeconomics should be ascribed not to 
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Keynes’ General Theory but to the subsequent models that tried to translate Keynes’ 
blurred message into a precise model.”  Not only was Keynes not a theorist – not a 
producer of models – but the fact that he was not bars him from having founding 
macroeconomics, defined as a theoretical discipline. 
  There are, of course, many objections to De Vroey’s characterization, not least 
that the General Theory is by no means devoid of formal, mathematical reasoning; yet it 
does capture the spirit of modern attitudes toward theory.  Lucas (1980) argued that the 
only reason the economists of the 1930s did not use the dynamic methods of the 1980s 
was that they lacked the mathematical machinery:  “To ask why [they] did not make use 
of the contingent-claim view of equilibrium is . . . like asking why Hannibal did not use 
tanks against the Romans instead of elephants.  We known from Keynes’s deep 
appreciation of Ramsey’s “Mathematical Theory of Savings” that he was fully capable of 
understanding formalized theory and using it to good account (JMK VI, p. 144; JMK X, 
pp. 335-6).  Still, Keynes saw the limits to purely formal reasoning.  As a matter of style:  
“there are occasions for very exact methods of statement, such as are employed in Mr. 
Russell’s Principia Mathematica.  But there are advantages also in writing the English of 
Hume” (JMK VIII, p. 20).  As a matter of substance: 
It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of formalising a 
system of economic analysis . . . that they expressly assume strict independence 
between the factors involved and lose all their cogency and authority if this 
hypothesis is disallowed; whereas, in ordinary discourse, where we are not blindly 
manipulating but know all the time what we are doing and what the words mean, 
we can keep “at the back of our heads” the necessary reserves and qualifications 
and the adjustments which we shall have to make later on, in a way in which we 
cannot keep complicated partial differentials “at the back” of several pages of 
algebra which assume that they all vanish.  Too large a proportion of recent 
“mathematical” economics are merely concoctions, as imprecise as the initial 
assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities 
and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful 
symbols. (JMK VII, pp. 299-298). 
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  Just as striking as his commitment to English prose is the manner in which 
Keynes embeds his theoretical writings in topical policy debates.  Stylistically, the 
distinction between Russell and Hume is a genuine distinction; yet it fails to get to the 
core difference between Keynes’s theory and modern macroeconomics.  Yes, some 
modern macroeconomics is abstract and academic; nonetheless, modern 
macroeconomists also serve as policy advisors and find their formal models of some 
service in that capacity.  Still, the true difference between modern macroeconomic theory 
and Keynes’s theory is, I believe, not unrelated to Keynes’s perspective as a policy 
advisor.
1  Whereas modern theory serves as a simulacrum of the economy – stylized and 
abstract, to be sure – Keynes’s theory is a diagnostic instrument in the service of Dr. 
Keynes, consulting economic physician.
2
II. Marshallian and Walrasian Methodology 
Keynes spent his intellectual childhood dangled, as it were, on Alfred Marshall’s knee.  
His methodology is Marshallian in the sense of Milton Friedman’s (1949, 1955) useful 
contrast with Walrasian methodology (Hoover 1988, pp. 218-220; Hammond 1996, pp. 
ch. 2).   
  Marshallian methodology sees economic theory as an “economic organon” – “not 
a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth, similar to, say, 
the theory of mechanics,” providing “systematic and organized methods of reasoning” 
                                                 
1 I accept Clarke’s (1988) thesis that the Treatise on Money was strongly formed by Keynes’s 
contemporaneous experience as an advisor to the U.K. Treasury, while the General Theory was a more 
intellectually detached work.  Nonetheless, I believe that without experience in practical policy making, the 
General Theory would have been a very different book. 
2 Keynes was not a doctor, even in the sense that most modern academics are.  The degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy was uncommon in England in many subjects until after World War II, so that Keynes, like 
Marshall, Pigou, Hicks, and many others held only an MA degree, which involved no further study beyond 
the BA.  Keynes also never held the title Professor.  He was a long-serving fellow of King’s College, 
Cambridge. 
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about factually based hypotheses concerning the “manner of action of causes” (Marshall 
1885, pp. 159, 164, 171).   
  Walrasian methodology is named after the French economist Leon Walras (1834-
1910), a pioneer of the theories of marginal utility and general equilibrium.  Friedman, 
who, at the time he first drew the distinction, probably had only a second-hand 
knowledge of Walras’s principal works, described Walrasian methodology as seeking 
abstractness, generality, and a breadth of assumptions that would permit it capture 
“photographically” (Friedman’s term) a systemic picture of the economy.  Although 
Walras’s theory of general equilibrium gave rise to the highly influential work of Gerard 
Debreu (1959), which long defined high mathematical theory in economics, Friedman’s 
term is less directed at pure mathematical economics than at the approach that the 
prestige of such methods – even before Debreu – spawned among economists in more 
applied and empirical fields.  As Friedman (1949, 83) puts it:  “we curtsy to Marshall but 
walk with Walras.”  Koopmans’s strongly a priori interpretation of the Cowles 
Commission program provides a good example of the Walrasian approach (Koopmans 
1950; Hood and Koopmans 1953; Hendry and Morgan 1995, ch. 43).  The economy is 
viewed as a system, and theory is only as good as the completeness of its systematic 
grasp.  While the models can be related to data along hypothetico-deductive lines, the 
emphasis is on the deduction from formal structures (essential to the approach to 
identification) with little feedback from data to theory.   
  The distinction between Walrasian and Marshallian methodology is not a 
distinction between general and partial equilibrium, if general equilibrium means a 
recognition of the complex interdependence of the various parts of the economy.  Rather 
it is between a theory that is comprehensive and one that is purpose-built.  It is necessary, 
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according to Marshall (1885, p. 160) “to sacrifice generality of form to some extent.”  
“There is no use in waiting idly for [a unified social science]; we must do what we can 
with our present resources.”  He goes on, “common sense does not deal with a complex 
problem as a whole.  Its first step is to break the problem into its several parts. . . . the 
human mind has no other method of inquiry than this (Marshall 1885, p. 164).  The 
economist, Marshall (1885, p. 171) believes, “must stand by the more laborious plan of 
interrogating the facts in order to learn the manner of action of causes singly and in 
combination.”   
  Where Friedman cast the Marshallian/Walrasian distinction as a contrast between 
concreteness and abstractness, I have elsewhere cast in terms of different strategies 
(Hoover 2004b).  With the problem of microfoundations in mind, I contrasted a 
Walrasian engineering strategy with a Marshallian archaeological strategy.  Both want to 
understand the structure of the economic building.  For the Walrasian, it is a question of 
working it out, starting with the foundations.  If we do not get them right, the 
superstructure will be shaky.  For the Marshallian, the problem is that a systematic 
structure lies beneath the complexities of economic reality.  To lay this structure bare we 
must dig down to the find the foundations, modifying and adapting our theoretical 
understanding as new facts accumulate, becoming ever more confident in our grasp of the 
superstructure, but never quite sure that we have reached the lowest level of the structure.   
  Keynes’s  attitude is similar to Marshall’s, but Keynes is more a physician than 
archaeologist.  Keynes’s hands are soiled not by the dust of an economic Pompeii, but by 
the blood, sweat, and ordure of the body economic.  Like the body, the key mechanisms 
of the living economy are just as hidden and probably more complex than a buried city.  
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And rather than a detached, academic interest, the study of economic physiology 
originates in the pressing need for diagnosis and cure.  
3
 
III. An Exemplar:  A Tract on Monetary Reform 
How does Keynes’s Marshallian method play out in practice?  And what is the role of 
theory it?  While Keynes’s theory changes and develops across the three major economic 
works (the Tract on Monetary Reform (1923), the Treatise on Money (1930), and The 
General Theory (1936)), they display a consistent methodology and a similar structure.  
Of the three, the Tract was directed toward the broadest audience and employs the 
simplest theoretical structure, making it easier to see the role of theory in Keynes’s 
methodological conception. 
  The opening two chapters of the Tract introduce the problem of price stability.  
Keynes sees the price fluctuations since the First World War as of a different order of 
magnitude than earlier fluctuations and as “one of the most significant events in the 
economic history of the modern world” (JMK IV, p. 1).  Characteristically, Keynes sets 
the stage with a data-rich description of the economic landscape.  Perhaps more important 
he engages in conceptual analysis, starting with a taxonomy of economic agents.  Keynes 
lays out the costs of both inflation and deflation and its differential effects on investors 
(who later in the General Theory he prefers to call rentiers), businessmen, and earners, 
concluding that inflation is “unjust” and deflation “inexpedient” (JMK IV, p. 36).   
  He also provides a preliminary sketch of the quantity theory of money.  The 
quantity theory is one of the oldest theories in economics.  Broadly, it states that the 
                                                 
3   Keynes himself, as well as expressing the view that “[i]f economists could manage to get 
themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid” (JMK 
IX, p. 332), was no stranger to medical metaphors:  e.g., JMK IV, p. 80; JMK VI, pp. 130, 199ff. 
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general level of prices in an economy is proportional to the stock of money.  Keynes 
initial discussion takes some sophisticated detours, including one on how the quantity 
theory would be have to be modified to suit a hyperinflation.  Anticipating the famous 
analysis of Cagan (1956), Keynes argued that the demand for money would fall during a 
period of extremely rapidly rising prices, as the inflation increased the cost of holding 
money measured by the accelerating fall in its purchasing power measured in the goods it 
could buy, encouraging people to avoid holding it whenever possible.  In order to bring 
the supply and demand into alignment, the level prices would have to rise more than 
proportionately to the increase in stock of money.   
  Keynes sketches the political economy of inflation, laying the ultimate blame at 
the feet of an impecunious government and the political influence of the debtor class.  
The preliminary conceptual and data analysis sets up the main object of the subsequent 
theoretical analysis:  how to secure, on average, an zero rate of expected inflation while 
minimizing the variability of the general price level. 
  The analytical core appears in Chapter 3, “The Theory of Money and the Foreign 
Exchanges.”  Here Keynes says “we must lay the theoretical foundations for the practical 
suggestions of the concluding chapters.”  While some of the most interesting analysis 
concerns the foreign exchanges, we will concentrate here on Keynes’s use of the quantity 
theory.  Unlike in his later works in which Keynes aims at theoretical innovation, in the 
Tract he adopts what he regards as Marshall’s account of the quantity theory.  “This 
theory,” he writes, “is fundamental.  Its correspondence to the facts is not open to 
question.  Nevertheless, it is often misstated and misrepresented” (JMK IV, p. 61).  His 
aim is to state it accurately in terms that are precisely defined. 
  The quantity equation in Keynes’s notation can be written: 
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n = p(k + rk΄), 
 
where n is cash in circulation with the public; p is a cost-of-living index (measured as 
price per consumption unit); the public wishes to hold the equivalent of  k units of 
consumption goods as cash and a further k΄ units as  bank deposits; r is the  customary 
bank-deposit reserve ratio (the fraction of deposits that banks must hold in cash), so that 
rk΄ is banks’ holdings of reserves (JMK IV, p. 63).  The characteristic neutrality property 
of the quantity theory (i.e., the proportionality of prices to money) is demonstrated on the 
assumption that cash (n) increases while the habits of the public and the banks (k + rk΄) 
remain constant:  to maintain equality in the quantity equation, prices must rise 
proportionately. 
  In keeping with other quantity theorists, such as David Hume and Irving Fisher, 
Keynes notes that neutrality is, at best, a long-run property.
4  In the short run it is a 
mistake to assume that k, k΄, and r are independent of n.  Keynes’s analysis of the short 
run follows a characteristic pattern.  The object is the analysis of inflation and deflation.  
The ultimate causes are exhaustively considered, but the model is not extended to 
formalize the analysis.  The quantity equation itself is the limit of formal analysis.  
Keynes uses it to provide a classificatory scheme for the various causes.  Those that 
operate through changing cash fall under n; through changing credit conditions, under r; 
changing real balances (money demand), under k and k΄.  While k and k΄ are not directly 
controllable, they can be influenced by bank-rate policy and remaining instabilities can 
be offset through the directly controllable n and r. 
                                                 
4 It is here that Keynes delivers his quip about being dead in the long run. 
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  In the remainder of Chapter 3 Keynes goes on to develop the theory of foreign 
exchange, but this is a good point to pause and take stock.  The final chapters of the Tract 
use the theory of Chapter 3 to reanalyze the problems identified in the first two chapters 
and to propose a set of policy recommendations to achieve the end of price stability.  
Taken as a whole the Tract has the form of a diagnostic manual:  a symptomatology, 
relevant physiology, illustrative case studies, and treatment and management options.  
  The analytical pattern of the Tract is exactly the same as that of the Treatise on 
Money.  The General Theory is also conceived in the same functional pattern, though the 
book itself is concentrates on the relevant physiology, leaving the other aspects at a 
casual and underdeveloped level.  Keynes self-consciously adopted this more academic 
and detached form “chiefly addressed to [his] fellow economists” since he believed that 
the failures of orthodox economics were not to be found “in the superstructure, which has 
been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of 
generality in the premises” (JMK VII, p. xxi).   
  Returning to the example of the Tract, the modern economist might be inclined to 
question whether Keynes’s reformulated quantity equation qualifies as a theoretical 
contribution at all.  It is a far cry from Debreu – or Walras for that matter.  But theory in 
economics has come to have a peculiar meaning.  The Oxford English Dictionary lists as 
series of definitions that capture Keynes’s conception.  One defines theory as:  “A 
conception or mental scheme of something to be done, or of the method of doing it; a 
systematic statement of rules or principles to be followed.”  His major theoretical works 
are certainly that.   
  A second runs:   
A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a 
group of facts or phenomena; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established 
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by observation or experiment, and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the 
known facts; a statement of what are held to be the general laws, principles, or 
causes of something known or observed. 
This fits Keynes’s clearly casual analysis and explanatory intent:  “The moral” of his 
theoretical account of the quantity theory, Keynes writes, “is that the price level is not 
mysterious, but is governed by a few, definite, analysable influences” (JMK IV, p. 68).   
  Perhaps the most apt definition runs:  “That department of an art or technical 
subject which consists in the knowledge or statement of the facts on which it depends, or 
this principles or methods, as distinguished from the practice of it.”  One citation, for 
instance, contrasts music theory, the knowledge of harmony, counterpoint, and so forth, 
with the art of playing.  The Tract, like the Treatise, fits easily into this mold. 
  Even if we concede that Keynes has a theory, would not a modern critic be right 
to regard it is a thin gruel?  That would be to misunderstand the function of theory in 
Keynes’s diagnostic schema.  The quantity equation in the Tract represents a key part of 
the complex economy, the causal nexus (to use Keynes’s own phrase; JMK VII, p. 173) 
that connects money, prices, and the real economy.  Essentially, it is meant to capture and 
isolate a mechanism.  Inputs come from outside this mechanism, and the variables of the 
quantity equation themselves exercise a causal influence over other variables outside 
mechanism.  But the equation captures the fundamental causal connections among n, p, k, 
k΄, and r.  It serves as an accounting statement:  whatever the complex of causes, their 
effects on the variables of the quantity equation must respect the identity; if any cause is 
alters p, it must do so, not directly, but through its effect on n, k, k΄, or r.  The theory is 
not a machine for prediction, but a tool for analysis.  It provides a principled framework 
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for systematically classifying the various symptoms of economic maladies, charting their 
likely courses, and suggesting an appropriate regimen.
5
 
IV. Theory as a Causally Isolated System 
The diagnostic role of theory in Keynes’s economics accounts for his ubiquitous use of 
causal language.
6  Causality is naturally a diagnostic concept (Hoover 2004a).  English 
idiom says, “I started the car,” not “I caused the car to start.”  But if the car stalls, it is 
perfectly idiomatic to say, “what caused it to stall?”  Keynes underscores the importance 
of a causal account in the opening lines of Chapter 10 of the Treatise: 
The fundamental problem of monetary theory is not merely to establish identities or 
statical equations relating (e.g.) the turnover of monetary instruments to the 
turnover of things traded for money.  The real task of such a theory is to treat the 
problem dynamically, analysing the different elements involved, in such a manner 
as to exhibit the causal process by which the price level is determined, and the 
method of transition from one position of equilibrium to another. [JMK V, p. 120] 
  Keynes’s strategy, as we saw in respect of the Tract, is to single out a causal 
nexus as the theoretical core of the analysis.  But what qualifies a relationship to be an 
element of this nexus?  Keynes’s analytical practice can be clarified by Figure 1.  Arrows 
represent causal influence running from inputs to outputs through the causal nexus or 
theoretical core.  This is fits the Marshallian strategy, as the theoretical core need not be 
the core of the whole economy, but only of that part relevant to the problem at hand.   
  The economy is complex, so the number of inputs (N) and outputs (M) may be 
very large.  So too, in principle, may the number of elements of the causal core.  Only 
                                                 
5 Keynes’s diagnostic use of the quantity theory bears a close kinship with Friedman and Schwartz’s 
(1963a, b) analysis of the monetary history of the United States.  This is hardly surprising as Friedman was 
equally a disciple of Marshall (see Hoover 2004c) and knew and approved of both the Tract on Monetary 
Reform and the Treatise on Money, despite his reputation as an anti-Keynesian, which was based largely on 
his objections to the policies advocated by followers of Keynes after the publication of the General Theory. 
6 Some examples of Keynes’s ubiquitous use of causal language are found in JMK IV, pp. 129, 142; JMK 
V, pp. 126, 139, 141, 163; 166, 201, 244, 231; JMK VII, pp. 39, 57 
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four are shown in the figure, partly for expositional simplicity and partly because it 
illustrates Marshall’s methodological view that the central elements must be chosen in a 
way that keeps their number tractable.  Every possible linkage is shown among the four 
causal elements in the core, but the business of theory is to state the existence, nature, and 
direction of the linkages among causal variables, so not all these elements would be 
operative in a real theory. 
  The critical point is that the causal flow runs only in one direction from inputs to 
the core and from the core to outputs.  In particular, a link such as the one shown as a 
dashed gray line from the causal nexus to Input2 is ruled out.  This reflects Keynes’s 
strategy of laying out the core theory and then addressing the range of factors that 
influence its terms, each influencing the economy through the mediation of the core. 
  Can we rule out direct influences from inputs to outputs that do not go through the 
core as shown by the dashed gray link between InputN and OutputM?  Since Keynes does 
not offer us a methodological analysis, we can only infer from his practice.  One piece of 
evidence to suggest that such links should be ruled out is Keynes’s rejection of Fisher’s 
account of the effect of inflation on interest rates (JMK VII, p. 142).  Although Keynes 
accepts the fact of a correlation between interest rates and high inflation rates, he rejects 
Fisher’s account because, unlike Fisher, he sees it as the product of a more intricate 
causal chain rather than as a direct linkage.  Another piece of evidence is found in the 
sequence of more elaborate core theories that Keynes develops from the Tract through 
the General Theory.  In particular, the insight that Keynes believes separates the General 
Theory from his previous quantity-theoretic accounts is that the factors that determine 
prices also determine output, which leads him to widen his core theory to eliminate an 
unmediated linkage (JMK VII, p. xxii). 
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  Keynes’s analytical practice is not only Marshallian, it also is very much in the 
spirit of Simon’s (2001; also Boumans 2001) later account of near-decomposability.  For 
Simon a system is nearly decomposable when it can be divided into subsystems such that 
the linkages among the elements within each subsystem are strong and the linkages 
between subsystems are weak.  One Marshallian element of Simon’s conception is that, 
for many purposes, subsystems can be analyzed as independent units, neglecting the 
other, weakly linked subsystems.  In practice, Simon frequently associates 
decomposability with a temporal hierarchy:  the elements of a subsystem respond quickly 
to each other, but only slowly to those in other subsystems; and, indeed, individual 
subsystems can be treated as units relative to one another.  For example, plate tectonics 
treats the continents as subsystems that interact on a very long time horizon; while 
another part of geology, hydrology, treats the interactions of water flows within 
continents on a much shorter horizon.  Hydrology and plate tectonics lose little from 
mutual neglect. 
  That Keynes’s thinking ran along these lines is evident in his treatment of 
aggregation and in his famous distinction between the economics of the individual 
producer and the economics of output as a whole – later enshrined in the division 
between microeconomics and macroeconomics (JMK VII, pp. 293).  For Keynes, as for 
Simon, time-horizon is a key distinction.  It is often forgotten that Keynes’s famous bon 
mot, “[i]n the long run we are all dead,” was not offered as advice to live in the moment, 
but as an aside in an analytical decomposition:  “But this long run is a misleading guide 
to current affairs. . . Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in 
tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is 
flat again” (JMK IV, p. 65).  The level of the ocean matters (coastal cities are lost to 
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rising seas over centuries), but that process has nothing much to do with the immediate 
effects of, say, a tsunami.  Keynes was alert to what we might now call the paradox of 
monetarism:  in the long run neutral money is the least important factor in the economy; 
while in the short run non-neutral money may be the most important (e.g., JMK V, p. 83).  
  Keynes makes the point about decomposability less poetically but with more 
precision in the General Theory: 
The division of the determinant of the economic system . . . must be made entirely 
on the basis of experience, so as to correspond on the one hand to the factors in 
which the changes seem to be slow or so little relevant as to have only a small and 
comparatively negligible short-term influence on our quaesitum; and on the other 
hand to those factors in which the changes are found in practice to exercise 
dominant influence on our quaesitum . . . Our final task might be to select those 
variables which can be deliberately controlled or managed by central authority in 
the kind of system in which we actually live. [JMK VII, p. 247] 
Echoes of Marshall; anticipations of Simon. 
  Keynes is unusually attentive to definitions and preliminary conceptual analysis.  
The Treatise opens with a chapter on the classification of money, and it contains book of 
five chapters in 63 pages to the problem of identifying the appropriate price index for 
money.  The General Theory similarly devotes a book of four chapters in 51 pages to 
“Definitions and Ideas.”  Keynes’s focus on conceptual precision can be best understood 
as an attempt to articulate his theory in a manner that corresponds to the causal joints of 
the economy.
7  Referring to his own version of the quantity equation in the Treatise, 
Keynes observes: 
they are mere identities; truisms which tell us nothing in themselves.  In this respect 
they resemble all other versions of the quantity theory of money.  Their only point 
is to analyse and arrange our material in what will turn out to be a useful way for 
tracing cause and effect, when we have vitalized them by the introduction of 
extraneous facts from the actual world. [JMK V, p. 125; cf. p. 198]  
                                                 
7 It does not weaken the point about the function of these definitions to recall that Keynes’s Treatise on 
Money was severely criticized by Hayek and others because of its definitions.  
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  Once again, Keynes anticipates the views of a later author.  Cartwright (1989, 
chapter 2, section 2) tells the story of the Lamb dip, a phenomenon in which the intensity 
of a gas laser as a function of its frequency relative to resonance shows a double peak.  
The physicist Lamb was able to provide a mathematical analysis that permitted exact 
calculation of the effect, which he and others nevertheless regarded as inadequate until a 
causal account could be provided. 
  Keynes account of liquidity preference in the General Theory proceeds from a 
similar motivation.  Keynes taxes classical economics with maintaining simultaneously 
two different, and causally unconnected theories of the interest rate in which in “volume I 
dealing with the theory of value” it is determined by savings and investment and in 
“volume II dealing with the theory of money” it is determined by the quantity of money 
(JMK VII, p. 182).  Liquidity preference presents the interest rate as determined at the 
point that divides financial markets into two equally balanced groups – one expecting 
capital gains, the other capital losses.  The interest rate, in turn, is a causal determinant of 
investment through comparison to the marginal efficiency of capital.  Keynes argues that 
the traditional analysis is faulty because it has failed to isolate correctly the 
independent variables of the system.  Savings and investment are determinates of 
the system, not determinants. . . These determinants are, indeed, themselves 
complex and each is capable of being affected by prospective changes in the others.  
But they remain independent in the sense that their values cannot be inferred from 
one another. [JMK VII, pp. 183-184]
8
  Some have regarded Hicks’s (1946, ch. 12) demonstration of the equivalence of 
the liquidity-preference theory with the earlier loanable-funds theory of interest rates as 
showing that Keynes failed to understand simultaneity.  But this misses the point:  the 
Marshallian methodology and causal isolation require that, while some relationships may 
                                                 
8 Keynes’s characterization of independence here anticipates Simon’s (1953) definition of casual order with 
reference to recursive systems. 
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be simultaneous, not every variable can be endogenous in any practically useful analysis.  
(The spirit of the modern vector-autoregression approach to econometrics in which the 
only exogenous terms are random shocks is quite contrary to Keynes’s methodology.)  
Keynes, like Lamb, looks for an account in which not only does everything add up, but 
the causal forces are accurately mapped.   
  It is practically important to get the causal articulation right.  Keynes argues that 
unclearness about “the causal process through which a reduction in the quantity of money 
leads eventually to . . . lower . . . prices” encourages the policymaker “to contemplate 
deflation too light heartedly” (JMK V, p. 244).   
  A preference for causal articulation has a surprising implication for Keynes.  One 
must sometimes prefer qualitative to quantitative investigation.  Fisher’s quantity 
equation, Keynes admits in the Treatise, is better suited to analyzing the available data 
(JMK V, p. 210).  Where Keynes, following Cambridge tradition, always related the 
quantity of money to income, Fisher’s famous quantity equation, MV = PT, relates 
money to the volume of transactions, which generally exceeds incomes by many orders 
of magnitude as businesses engage in many pounds’ (or dollars’) worth of monetary 
exchanges in the process of generating each pound or dollar of income.  Although 
Keynes accepted that the alternatives to his “fundamental equations,” including not only 
Fisher’s, but also his own quantity equation from the Tract, are equally good as 
accounting identities, he came to believe that they fail to map the causes that truly 
animate the economy (JMK V, pp. 198-199).  The economy is sufficiently complex, and 
precise conceptual analysis demonstrates, that it is difficult – or impossible – to capture 
key causes in statistical data:  expectations, for example, are intrinsically unobservable.  
Qualitative analysis is often the best that we can do. 
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V. Theory and the Real World 
Keynes’s modern reputation largely rests on the General Theory and his opposition to 
Tinbergen’s program of econometric modeling is well known (XIV, pp. 306-318); it is 
thus easy to see him as divorced from data or, perhaps, even hostile to it.  But the Tract is 
chock full of data, and Keynes introduces volume 2 of the Treatise, as “the applied theory 
and a quantitative study of the facts as they exist in the leading monetary systems of 
today” (JMK VI, p. 3).
9  How does Keynes imagine that theory is applied and how do 
facts relate to it? 
  The pure/applied distinction is not simply a distinction between theory that is 
quantified and adapted to particular economic organizations.
10  Rather pure theory 
concerns the theoretical core or causal nexus of Keynes’s theory, while applied theory 
concerns its linkages to the inputs and outputs shown in Figure 1.  Much of volume 2 of 
the Treatise concerns the influence of factors such as bank rate, which do not appear in 
the theoretical core directly, on outcomes for the real economy, also not in the core, 
mediated through Keynes’s fundamental equations. 
  Keynes approach is not empiricist in the hypothetical-deductive mode; he does 
not subject his theory to direct tests.  We might think of Keynes’s theories as synthetic a 
priori.  “A priori” because they are largely based on common sense and background 
knowledge, which may include implicitly deductions from the mainstream economic 
theory of Marshall and other neoclassicals.  “Synthetic” not analytic because, unlike 
                                                 
9 Bateman (1990) anticipates a key point of this essay:  despite Keynes’s critical assault on Tinbergen, 
Keynes was neither an opponent of empirical economics nor of econometrics in general. 
10 See Backhouse (1998), pp. 88-91, for a discussion of the difficulties of drawing a sharp distinction 
between economic theory and applied economics in Keynes’s time, and Backhouse and Biddle (2000), 
especially pp. 1-7 for a discussion of Keynes’s own view of the distinction. 
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Austrians (such as Menger 1950 and Mises 1966), Keynes does not regard economic 
theory as a branch of pure logic; rather, like Marshall, he regards it is an instrument of 
inquiry into facts about causes.   
  On the one hand, theory does not relate to data in the simple pattern of 
verification or falsification.  Prior theory is critical to understanding the import of data.  
Malthus was, in Keynes’s view, hard pressed to overthrow dominant Ricardian theory, 
despite its empirical inadequacies, in large measure because “he failed to furnish an 
alternative [theoretical] construction” (JMK VII, p. 32).  On the other hand, theory can be 
reasonably adjusted to fit the facts.  For example, Keynes infers the smoothness of the 
aggregate liquidity-preference function, not from prior theoretical considerations, but 
from the efficacy of open-market operations (JMK VII, p. 197). 
  Keynes’s vision of the economy is that it is complex and our our knowledge of it 
is bound to be incomplete and frequently qualitative only.  Keynes’s (XIV, pp. 306-318) 
attack on Tinbergen’s econometric business-cycle model was based in large measure on 
the presumed requirement of Tinbergen’s (1939) statistics to capture a complete list of 
causes and for the relationships among the variables to be quantitatively stable – in his 
view an utter impossibility.  Clearly, Keynes would have shown the same skepticism 
towards Tinbergen’s successors, the Cowles-Commission’s econometric program 
(Koopmans 1950; Hood and Koopmans 1953), and the “Keynesian” efforts to use 
macroeconometric models to “fine tune” the economy. 
  Equally, Keynes would have dissented from the more recent vision of the goal of 
theory as providing a simulacrum for the economy.  Lucas states the vision clearly: 
Our task . . . is to write a FORTRAN program that will accept specific economic 
policy rules as “input” and will generate as “output” statistics describing the 
operating characteristics of time series we care about, which are predicted to result 
from these policies. [Lucas 1980, p. 288] 
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Although Lucas’s division of inputs, theoretical model, and outputs echoes the categories 
used in Figure 1 to describe Keynes’s own vision, there are essential differences.  Lucas’s 
program can work only if it captures all the causally relevant factors, since he wants 
predictions or quantified operating characteristics of the economy.  In effect, Lucas 
makes no distinction between causal relations that belong to the nexus and those that are 
outside it.  It is as if the box representing the causal nexus were drawn around the entire 
causal system.   
  In contrast, Keynes, with his Marshallian methodology, does not assert that the 
causal nexus is complete – hence the causal connections among inputs and among 
outputs that do not run through the causal nexus.  His theory can, even when applied 
quantitatively, at best suggest tendencies and influences can provide guidance to the 
policymaker, but not forecasts on which any confidence can be placed. 
  Keynes endorses “[t]he reasonable doubts of practical men [particularly Governor 
Strong], towards the idea that ‘the Federal Reserve System has the power to raise or 
lower the price level by some automatic method, by some magic mathematical formula” 
(JMK VI, p. 305).  More positively, Keynes offers a vision of the task of theory quite 
different from Lucas’s:  “The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or 
method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, but to provide 
ourselves with an organized and orderly method of thinking out particular problems . . .” 
(JMK VII, p. 297).  In discussing the credit cycle, he observes that 
[t]he possible varieties of the paths which a credit cycle can follow and its possible 
complications are so numerous that it is impracticable to outline all of them.  One 
can describe the rules of chess and the nature of the game, work out the leading 
openings and play through a few characteristic end-games; but one cannot possibly 
catalogue all the games which can be played. [JMK V, p. 253] 
  20Doctor Keynes:  Economic Theory in a Diagnostic Science.                                                                   Kevin D. Hoover 
                                                                                                                                                                       25 April 2005 
An effective economic theory is like a good chess manual, a source of guidance and 
wisdom to the practitioner, but not a mechanical algorithm for translating policy goals 
into policy actions nor a crystal ball for foretelling their precise consequences. 
  The test of a theory as an element of a diagnostic manual is not found in a crucial 
experiment but in the ability of theory to make sense of the economic situation.  Keynes 
proves the theory of the Treatise in the case studies of historical episodes in chapter 30 of 
volume 2.  Even in the more academic General Theory, he suggests that the marker of 
success is “that our theory must be capable of explaining the phenomena of the trade 
cycle.”   
  This is the clue to Keynes’s theoretical development from a Marshallian quantity-
theorist to the aggregate-supply-and-demand analyst of the General Theory.  There is no 
simple, statistical test; yet the theory must make sense of the data and offer a persuasive 
causal account of the actual development of the economy.  While denying that the 
preconditions for formal statistical tests existed, he nevertheless preferred to examine his 
theories ability to rationalize quantitative data where possible.  Because he believed that 
many of the causally relevant conclusions of his theory were necessarily not quantitative, 
such examinations were not always possible.  Yet that did not put the theories beyond 
test.  In a telling aside, Keynes suggests that the doubts expressed by Federal Reserve 
Governor Strong about the efficacy of monetary control “cannot be dispelled merely by 
pointing to the truisms of a quantity equation.  In a sense they can only be dispelled by 
the prolonged success of an actual attempt at scientific control” (JMK VI, p. 309).  
Theories are tested, then, not only directly by economists but indirectly through the 
successes and failures of policymakers.  One of Keynes’s goals for his theoretical 
analysis was to demonstrate that the prospects of success warranted the trial.  The 
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successive elaborations of Keynes’s monetary theory were each motivated by his 
perception that the previous version had proved inadequate to the rationalization of the 
data or to the support of practical policy – a pragmatic, rather than academic, standard. 
 
VI. The Economic Theorist in the Economy 
Keynes’s pragmatic, diagnostic conception of economic theory provides a different, and 
perhaps more satisfactory understanding, of the role of the economist in the economy.  
Returning to Keynes’s chess analogy, we can think of the “Keynesians” after World War 
II as seeing the economist as a chess master, who can stand above the board and move the 
pieces – at least within some limits.  The perspective is overarching, if not omniscient.  
And, indeed, the ambition seemed to be a more comprehensive, predictive understanding 
of how the economic game would play out conditional on various moves – as if IBM’s 
“Big Blue” or its successor were to replace Keynes’s chess manual. 
  The new classical economists, particularly in the wake of Lucas (1976) critique of 
econometric policy evaluation, argued that this vision was faulty, because the pieces were 
not ciphers, but actors of the same species as the policymakers.  The new classical 
solution was, in effect, to endow each piece with the same information and perspective as 
the chess master.  Yet the ambition was still a comprehensive, predictive understanding 
of the outcomes of the game.  It was quickly pointed out that there are paradoxes in such 
an approach.  If the pieces know as much as the chess master, who knows everything 
relevant up to a random error and can, therefore, predict the future (the rational-
expectations hypothesis), then in what sense can the policymaker truly be an advice 
giver.  Sargent (1984) saw this as a paradox of free will (cf. Craine and Hardouvelis 
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1983; LeRoy 1995).  In the effort to respect the intentionality of the economic agent, the 
policymaker himself has been reduced to a cipher. 
  Keynes’s strategy is different.  Neither the economist nor the economic agent 
possesses the practical omniscience of rational expectations.  The chess player is just 
another player of the board – say, the king’s bishop.  Yes, he possesses a chess manual, 
but it is one that has been written, not from the overarching perspective of the chess 
master, but from the ground-level view of the bishop.  Acquisition of economic 
knowledge occurs within the game.  It is necessarily partial, bound by particular 
perspectives, and subject to debate.  Yes, Keynes and his fellow economists are the 
bishops.  They argue and debate.  They possess the arcane knowledge of the manuals of 
play; in that sense they know more than the other players.  Their theories may be cast in 
an over-arching perspective, but this is merely a projection from inside the game, and not 
the product of a standpoint that they somehow occupy above the game.  The test of their 
theories is largely the success of their policy advice:  does their side win the game?  But 
tests of that sort can be run only if the economists can convince the kings, queens, and 
even the pawns to follow their manual.   
  Seen this way, Keynes’s understanding of the place of economic theory in the 
economy makes neither the mistake of the “Keynesians” nor suffers from the paradoxes 
of the new classicals.  And it suggests that Keynes’s persistent efforts to cast his 
economic theory into a specific policy context and, more often than not, to expound it in 
forms that would be accessible to the policymaker and the literate public arose not only 
out of a personal urge to practical action, but out of an understanding of the function and 
limitations of economic theory itself. 
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